master
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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umbra audio
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0461dff9d2 |
Use the email address as the login identifier and require confirmation
Sign-in now takes the email address rather than a username. This needed no migration: users.email is already citext NOT NULL UNIQUE in the control plane, so it is a case-insensitively unique login key on its own. username survives as an optional display handle for audit lines and is never a login path, which removes the redundancy of asking an administrator for two identifiers. An account created by an administrator now starts in the control plane's invited state and cannot sign in until a single-use link is consumed. The token maps onto bootstrap_tokens, which was already shaped for exactly this and had been unused, so that needed no migration either. Modelling invited as a real state also retires the adapter's earlier fail-closed refusal of that value, which existed because invited was previously unrepresentable. Three decisions worth stating plainly. The "email not verified" message is sent only after the password has been verified. Reporting it earlier would turn the login form into an oracle for which addresses have accounts, which is the one thing the uniform authentication error exists to prevent. A test asserts that a wrong password and an unknown account are byte-identical, and it caught a real bug: the check was first written before the password comparison, and the generic "not active" branch swallowed invited accounts. Both are now ordered deliberately. The operator bootstrap path does not require verification. The operator is attesting to the address themselves, which is the standing an administrator already has, and requiring a delivered email there would deadlock first-time setup on SMTP configuration that does not exist yet. The logging mail transport is refused in production. A deployment that logged links instead of sending them would appear to work while every new account sat permanently unverified. The development transport writes the link with the token redacted, because a log is where live credentials end up. That means a human cannot complete the flow by reading the log; the test harness captures the message in memory instead. This is a deliberate limitation rather than an oversight, and it is documented. Also: production now requires a mail transport and an absolute verification base URL alongside the existing DSN gate, because an account that cannot be verified cannot be used at all. 269 tests pass, 3 skipped. Verified end to end against a real uvicorn server: bootstrap login, organization creation, an invited account with its one-time password, and a handle rejected as a login path. |
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umbra audio
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31fd8720ec |
Add the PostgreSQL adapter for the authoritative store
Implements AccountRepository against the control-plane schema plus the phase-1 identity migration, and wires it in so production can select it. The adapter is not a thin SQL wrapper, because the control plane does not store the two things the application needs on the users row. Role and organization come from user_roles. There is no role column and no organization column on users; a role is assigned through user_roles with a scope, and app.validate_user_role_scope() enforces that the role's scope matches the assignment. Resolving one role per user is therefore a join, and a user holding more than one active assignment is refused rather than resolved to an arbitrary row. The organization on that assignment becomes the scope of every administrative decision, so guessing would hand out the wrong tenant's authority. Reconciling this with project-scoped membership stays an open review question, recorded as such. Email became a required field on account creation. users.email is NOT NULL UNIQUE, so accepting a missing address would let account creation succeed against the development repositories and then fail on the authoritative store. It is now required in the service, the API schema, and the bootstrap command, so it fails identically everywhere. Audit identifiers now belong to the store. audit_events.id is a bigint identity, so the adapter reports that value; the application correlation UUID is preserved in the detail and never displaces the row key. AuditEvent.id is a string for that reason, which removes a type the two stores disagreed about. Three further fail-closed behaviours: a users.status of invited or locked is refused rather than coerced onto active; a row with mfa_required is refused, because this phase cannot satisfy a second factor and authenticating it anyway would grant access to someone who was supposed to present one; and a missing organization blocks access rather than granting it. save_user deliberately does not write username or email, since both are identity keys with no reviewed change path and no audit event behind them. Every operation runs in one transaction on one pooled connection and publishes the caller with SET LOCAL app.current_user_id, so a returned connection cannot carry one request's identity into the next. That is inert until the reviewed RLS policies exist; the explicit WHERE clauses enforce scope today. A statement timeout bounds how long a pooled connection can be held. Production fails closed at two independent gates: the settings layer refuses without a DSN, and the repository boundary refuses to build a PostgreSQL store without one. Verified by running both, including that an unreachable host refuses to start rather than degrading. The migration gains an index on audit_events (target_type, target_id), which the administrator audit filter needs and nothing covered, and the review questions now include the three things that must be checked before provisioning: the roles rows and their scopes, any row with mfa_required set, and any user holding more than one active assignment. Verification, and its limit. 236 tests pass with 3 skipped. The adapter's row mapping, role resolution, conflict mapping, and configuration are unit tested and run everywhere. Its SQL, transactions, and pooled reuse are NOT executed: this environment has no database credentials, because sudo to the postgres user needs a password, there is no umbra database role, and there is no .pgpass. The integration suite is written and selected by UMBRATRANS_TEST_DSN, and its fixture refuses any DSN whose database name contains umbracontrol. A green run here says nothing about whether the SQL is correct. |
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umbra audio
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0b9c4d4220 |
Add organization tenancy and same-origin frontend mounting
The administrator interface needs organizations to manage, and the slice had none: users.organization_id was a bare UUID pointing at nothing, so there was no tenant to create, list, or validate an account against. Tenancy: - Organization record with name, slug, and status active|suspended|archived, matching the control-plane vocabulary rather than reusing the account one. - Reads are open to any administrator; every write is platform-admin only, so the tenant boundary stays under a single authority. An organization admin is pinned to the organization on their own principal. - A derived slug is normalized from the display name, but a slug the operator typed must already be canonical, so nothing is silently rewritten behind their back. archived is terminal. - GET /api/uadmin/summary for the dashboard, recomputed per request from the same scoped queries the list endpoints use, so a summary cannot disclose a number the caller could not reach by listing. Two integrity gaps closed: 1. Account creation accepted any UUID as an organization. It now requires the organization to exist and to be active. 2. Suspending an organization revoked member sessions but did not stop new logins, because each member's own account status stays active. Both authenticate and resolve_session now refuse a member of a non-active organization, and a missing organization record blocks access rather than granting it. A test asserts the member is still active yet locked out. Migration, still unapplied: section 4 creates organizations with CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so a control-plane table is skipped, never redefined, and the rollback drops it only when this migration actually created it. The membership divergence is recorded as the top open review question rather than decided: user_roles is the control plane's membership source, this phase uses a column, and the migration adds no membership column so the choice stays open. Serving: UMBRATRANS_STATIC_ROOT mounts the browser client at / after the API routes, so the session cookie and CSRF header work without CORS. HTML responses get their own CSP allowing only same-origin script and style, which is why the frontend carries no inline script or style. Verification: 204 tests pass (21 new organization tests plus the existing suite), ruff check and format clean. Also exercised against a real uvicorn server rather than only the test client: bootstrap, forced password change, organization creation, one-time password issue, member lockout on organization suspension, and rejection of an account assigned to a suspended tenant. |
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umbra audio
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b474995414 |
Add phase-1 account management backend slice
Implements the account and user-management system behind the new web UI against development repositories only. Nothing here connects to, reads, or modifies the production umbracontrol database, and no account is created in any approved environment. Account service and API: - Local temporary-password and OIDC enrollment, separated by type. - Argon2id credentials, must-change enforcement, server-side sessions with hashed tokens, idle and absolute deadlines, rotation and revocation. - Administrator account management: list, get, create, suspend, reactivate, deactivate, revoke sessions, org-scoped audit view. - Hidden-prompt operator command for the first administrator, refusing production mode and refusing to run without a TTY. Temporary passwords are never accepted from a client. The request schema has no password field and refuses unknown fields; the administrator path generates the one-time password in process, hashes it immediately, and returns it once in the creation response. The account can reach no route, including /api/auth/me, until it replaces that password, after which the one-time value no longer authenticates. Security posture: fail-closed configuration, Secure cookies in production, double-submit CSRF, constant-time token comparison, generic authentication errors, audit detail allow-listing, and logger-tree secret redaction. Reviewed but unapplied: migrations/0001_phase1_identity.sql adds users.username, a separate user_credentials table, and additive session columns, with a rollback and open review questions. The PostgreSQL adapter is deliberately absent, so the application refuses to start in production rather than run against an unreviewed store. Verification: 169 tests pass (148 new, 21 pre-existing); ruff check, ruff format, compileall, and make web-check are clean. |